The Cratylus: An Explication by Upham, Elizabeth
Anthós (1990-1996)
Volume 1 | Number 3 Article 2
6-1992
The Cratylus: An Explication
Elizabeth Upham
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/anthos_archives
Part of the Philosophy of Language Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Anthós (1990-1996) by an authorized administrator of
PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Upham, Elizabeth (1992) "The Cratylus: An Explication," Anthós (1990-1996): Vol. 1: No. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/anthos_archives/vol1/iss3/2
THE CRATYLUS: AN EXPLICATION 
Elizabeth Upbam 
W hy do we say that when a cat "talks" it meows? Are the letters expressive of the 
true nature of a cat's voice? For that matter, why 
do we call a cat a cat? Where do we get the 
letters to form the words that form sentences? 
These are the questions Socrates, Hermogenes, 
and Cratylus attempt to answer in Plato's 
dialogue. They try to discover if things are 
named with consideration to phusis how the 
object or idea appears in nature, or nomos, law 
and convention. When the dialogue begins, 
Socrates is apparently pulled off the street to 
settle a rather complex argument between 
Cratylus and Hermogenes and he quickly 
confesses that he knows next to nothing about 
language and its origins-mainly because he 
couldn't afford the 50 drachma course on 
grammar-but he will do his best. It does 
become clear that Socrates is a little more 
informed than he led the two to believe, 
especially when he dissects words and names so 
effortlessly. 
At the beginning of the dialogue, Cratylus 
drops out after one line to, "preside" over the 
dialogue, almost like a judge presiding over a 
court, whose favor Socrates and Hermogenes are 
both trying to gain, since Hermogenes' lines: "he 
has a notion of his own ... and could entirely 
convince me if he chose," suggest that he holds 
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all the answers. Socrates lays a groundwork for discussion 
with the intention of getting to the truth. What follows is, a very 
subtle ring composition with all three men ending up in 
exactly the same place they started, whereas a dialogue such 
as The Symposium is constructed in a way as to let the reader 
know exactly what is to take place. 
Socrates begins by challenging Hermogenes' view that 
language is decided by convention and mutual agreement, 
seemingly rejecting it, but then he seems to agree with it later 
by 'pointing out that legislators, essentially men of law, are the 
ones' who name things. He states that legislators are the only 
ones really skilled enough to name things, much like the 
weaver is the only one who can use a shuttle effectively. In 
Greek, lawgiver is nomos and the word for name-giver is 
onoma, so Socrates is punning on the words throughout. An 
interesting coinparison can be dra~ here, since Socrates can 
be compared to a lawyer in a court and then he says that 
legislators are the only 'competent namers. Then Socrates starts 
to talk about nature and Hermogenes eggs him on by saying 
that he might be persuaded to a different view if only Socrates 
would "show him what this is which you term the natural 
fitness of names." Socrates once again professes his ignorance 
(which becomes an inte~al part of the dialogue), but says that 
he might be able to help Hennogenes with the help of Homer. 
He quotes from several sections of The Iliad, (20.74, Xanthus 
and Scamander; 14.291, Chalcis and Cymindis; 22.507, 
Astyanax and Scamandrius), where the gods have different 
names for things than mortals. These passages depict not only 
a parallel war among the gods, in which the gods can be taken 
to symbolize Athens, Corinth, ~nd Sparta in the beginning of 
the Peloponnesian War, but also a vivid image of Hera lying to 
and deceiving Zeus and using the god Sleep to drug him, 
much like the way Socrates fs lying to and deceiving 
Hermogenes, using his own so-called ignorance as his drug. 
Socrates then goes on to discuss a little about Hesiod's golden 
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race of daemons and then the flrst names of conunon people, 
then the appropriateness of heroes' names (and he calls them 
demi-gods later), and then finally the names of the gods, 
creating a familiar pattern of ascension. When Hermogenes 
praises him for his new found wisdom, Socrates credits 
Euthyphro, and not the fact that he actually had some idea of 
what he was talking about all along. 
Hermogenes asks him after his explication of the name of 
Zeus to discuss body and soul as he had just discussed the 
word man. Socrates says that not only is the body the grave of 
the soul, but it is the index of the soul and also the punishment 
of the soul. It is interesting to note here that the topic of body 
and soul marks a mid-way point for the ring composition that 
later becomes more apparent. The explication of gods' names 
is then taken up again, and Socrates says that maybe these are 
only the names that mortals know of and perhaps the gods call 
themselves differently, alluding to the quotes from Homer. 
Some names are easily derived with one meaning and some 
are not so easily derived and have n10re than one meaning, 
such as the name Apollo. Socrates says that the name of 
Apollo is, in his opinion, the most expressive of all the gods' 
names, meaning not only the usual music, prophecy, and 
archeIY, but also harmony and purity. When one keeps in 
mind that the gods in the allusion material can symbolize the 
city-states, one can assume that Socrates is using the god 
Apollo to personify Athens, suggesting that the city means 
everything, not only war and-in a sense-victory, but 
harmony. This harmony is thoroughly praised in Book I by an 
Athenian ambassador in Thucydides' Peloponnesian War. 
Socrates concludes by saying that he is afraid of the gods and 
tries to turn to another subject, but is easily persuaded back by 
a pleading Hermogenes. 
Instead of talking blatantly about the gods, as Hermogenes 
would like, Socrates discusses elements and discovers that 
primitive namers must have thought that everything was in 
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flux, much like the then modem philosophers, and that is why 
most all names have motion reflected in them. After the 
discussion on such principles as ~th and justice, Hennogenes 
calls him on the "improvisation" that has gone on before and 
says that he is, in effect, clainling another's findings as his 
own. Socrates hopes to make Hermogenes believe the 
originality, as he puts it, of the rest of his discussion, and 
plunges back in by once again discussing man, forming a 
distinct ring composition. 
Socrates starts to discuss the fact that really anybody can fit 
a word into any pattern of derivation simply by inserting and 
deleting letters, again comparing himself to the legislator he is 
so enamored of. Hennogenes doesn't really go for this, calls it 
shoddy, and Socrates tries to redeem himself by saying that no 
one will know because the original words have been long 
buried by added and missing letters. Socrates then concludes 
this lengthy discussion on virtue by saying that "if one person 
goes on analyzing names into words ... he who has to answer 
him must at last give up in despair." 
He then segues into a "what if' sequence where he asks 
Hermogenes how people would communicate if they had no 
voice or tongue; he also points out that music and art is a 
representation of nature and virtue without words. Socrates 
uses this image to talk about how words and letters are there 
to express the true nature of an object without playing 
charades or Pictionary; and he also says that words have to be 
an accurate representation of an object in order to be deemed 
true. 
After exploring the reflection of nature in the letters 
themselves (example: letters that have a hard sound are 
usually present in words signifying motion) and comparing 
them to the colors a painter might use, Cratylus rejoins the 
dialogue as Hennogenes drops out. Socrates drills Cratylus on 
names in relation to truth and falsehood, and prompdy makes 
a fool out of him by making Cratylus contradict himself. 
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Socrates reviews the previous conversation he had with 
Hermogenes with Cratylus akin to fmal summations. Cratylus 
gives his opinion that language is and should be a reflection of 
nature, and Socrates appears to accept this ideal to a point 
before he rejects it somewhat, like the nomos belief. He admits 
that he really doesn't know one way or the other, and implores 
the men to "come and tell" him the truth when they fmd it, 
ending in ambiguity similar to the beginning and completing 
the ring. 
My conclusion is that it is Plato's intent in this dialogue to 
compare Socrates to a legislator with the power to bestow 
appropriate names on things, even though he hides Socrates 
behind a veil of uncertainty about the true nature of names. 
He drugs Hermogenes and Cratylus, like Hera, not only with 
his ignorance but with his very presence, and tries to "suck" 
information out of them in order to complete his own lacking 
education. He is full of contradictions about his own 
knowledge on the subject, saying that if he had been able to 
afford the course on grammar and language he could answer 
the questions of Hermogenes and Cratylus easily, but he later 
suggests that SophiSts such as Protagoras really don't know 
what they are talking about, leaving the reader to answer all 
the unanswered questions and make up his or her own mind. 
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